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In memory ofPeter F. Drucker who brought so much to so many in the understanding of
management, and ofJohn J. Goossens, afriend and mentor in business.
THE REFORM0F THE EU COURTSI Version 2.0 1In 201 0, the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, including some substantial changes concerning
the EU courts 1 . Meanwhile, their workload is progressively increasing. Specifically, the
General Court’s backlog has become quite substantial 2 . In 201 1 , the Court of Justice has
presented an important proposai regarding this probiem. It aims at adding 1 2 new judges (and
consequently cabinets) to the General Court. The Commission has given ils support and
proposed some compiex modalities concerning the appointment ofjudges.
Such a reform of the General Court will have systemic consequences for the EU courts’
system. If the present proposais of the Court of Justice and the Commission are implemented
in 2012, the Generai Court wiii have gone from I 5 to 39 judges in oniy eight years. They thus
require an analysis of the long term implications. Before that, they require an analysis of the
productivity aspects. These have been bareiy debated untii now. However, in the midst of a
financiai crisis, the legisiative authorities may have legitimate questions about the budget
impact. This paper aims at bringing some modest comments (this is a new and compiex topic)
regarding the manageriai and financiai aspects of the avaiiabie options.
One wiii find here a brief description of the new context( 1), and of the possible objectives
of a reform( 2), some examples of productivity reforms that could increase production with
very limited costs( 3), and finally a more detaiied evaluation of the two possible structurai
reforms ( 4), i.e. adding 12 new judges to the General Court or creating an Intellectual
Property Court, limited in a first phase to a specific domain of trademarks and designs. From
a management point of view, reforms must indeed be divided into two categories. Some of
them are not too difficuit to implement and require no huge regulatory changes or additional
means (the “productivity solutions”). Others, on the contrary, require such changes and
additional means (the “structural solutions”).
In synthesis, the structural measures appear rather costly (especially the 12 new cabinets) and
should be considered as last resort ones. On the other hand, other measures, with very little
costs, could have a strong positive impact on the General Court’s productivity. Furthermore,
an immediate structural reform would go against fundamental principles of management (and
strategy). Before pumping more resources in a system, it is useful to analyze in depth where
the existing problems come from. If a plane flues low because there are numerous leaks in the
motor, one can always push much more kerosene in the motor but this is rarely seen as the
optimal way to improve performance. Plugging first the leaks is widely seen as more
economical. Furthermore, it is always dangerous to make immediate structural reforms with a
long term impact under the pressure of urgency. Finally, in the case of a sudden rise of
judicial activity in the next years (which is the working hypothesis of the debated proposais),
the neglect of the productivity measures could lead to an explosion of costs.
1 The author is judge at the Court of Justice of the European Union (General Court), and professor (in abeyance)
at the University of Liège. This comment is strictly personal.
2 Treaty terminology remains difficuit. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is the judicial
institution of the EU. It consists of the Cour of Justice (CJ), the General Court (GC) and the Civil Service
Tribunal (CST). 11e judges benefit from a cabinet. Their cabinet consists of 7 persons in the CJ, 5 persons in the
GC, and 2 in the CST.
THE REFORM 0F THE EU COURTSI Version 2.0 1 2In the present hard limes especially, each of us has to do his/her utmost to get more bangs
from the taxpayer’ s bucks. This is possible here, but it means that ail parties involved
(General Court’s judges and personnel, Court of Justice, Member States, budgetary
authorities, and legal counseis) have to accept some limited efforts.
This modest contribution pays tribute to Peter Drucker, for whom the author must confess a
long, deep and always growing admiration. Drucker’s books were seminai not only in the
diffusion of the science of management, but also in the reflection on the connections between
management and different evolutions of society. He should be mandatory reading in the
present changing EU environment. Most probably, his conclusion in this debate would have
been a briiliant and synthetic “it ‘s the people, stupid !“
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During the last 20 years, from the Maastricht Treaty onwards, the areas of EU cooperation
have undergone a tremendous expansion. This is bound to have fundamental consequences for
the structure of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). These consequences have
not been studied at length until now, since they were not immediate 3 .
It is essential to understand the multiple changes of the EU courts’ environment. As P.
Drucker emphasized, “public-service institutions find it far more difficuit to innovate than
even the most ‘bureaucratic’ company. The ‘existing’ seems to be even more of an obstacle.
To be sure, every service institution likes to get bigger. In the absence of a profit test, size is
the one criterion of success for a service institution, and growth a goal in itself. And then, of
course, there is always so much more that needs to be done. But stopping what has ‘aiways
been done’ and doing something new are equally anathema to service institutions, or at least
excruciatingly painful to them. Most innovations in public-service institutions are imposed on
them either by outsiders or by catastrophe.”
So, “the only way in which an institution—whether a government, a university, a business, a
labor union, an army—can maintain continuity is by building systematic, organized
innovation into its very structure. Institutions, systems, policies, eventually outlive
themselves, as do products, processes, and services. They do it when they accomplish their
objectives, and they do il when they fail to accomplish their objectives. Innovation and
entrepreneurship are thus needed in society as much as in the economy, in public service
institutions as much as in business.” 5
1.1. AnewTreaty
The Lisbon Treaty has simplified the ordinary decision process of the EU in different ways. It
has enlarged the scope of qualified majority voting, and also marginally reduced the qualified
majority floor. k has suppressed the third pillar and submitted ah intemal security matters
(immigration, asylum, police and justice cooperation) to the ordinary legislative procedure.
Finally, it has strongly strengthened the protection of fundamental rights in the EU law
system. The Charter of Fundamental Rights is now expressly part of the system and the EU
has to adhere to the ECHR. Naturally, treaties require time to be implemented. However,
logically, the combination of these changes should increase thejudicial workload.
Apart from these changes, the Lisbon Treaty has also set up a panel “in order to give an
opinion on candidates’ suitability to perform the duties of Judge and Advocate-General of the
Court of Justice and the General Court before the govemments of the Member States make
3 Many interesting pieces of information about the present situation can be found in the report of the House of
Lords EU committee : The workload of the Court of Justice of the European Union, HL Paper 128, 2011.
Ail documents concerning the legisiative procedure can be found on the web site of the Council of the EU. There
have been four documents from the Court of Justice untii now. The draft amendments to the statute of the CJEU
were presented in March 201 1 (Doc. 8787/1 1). An assessment of the financiai impact was presented the next
month (Doc. 8787/1 1, Add. 1). Further information was sent in Juiy 201 1 (Doc. 12719/1 1) and in November
201 1 (Doc. 12719/1 1). One opinion was given by the Commission [COM (201 1) 596].
4 P. DRUCKER, Innovation and entrepreneurship, 1985.
5 P. DRUCKER, Managing in a time of great change, 1995.
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three negative opinions regarding three candidates for the General Court. The creation of this
panel is an important change in the appointment process. One of the (many) difficulties of the
present context is that this new system is stili in an evolutionary phase, concerning for
example the extent of its standard of control and the weight of its opinions.
1.2. A bunch of new EU legislations
The volume of EU law is regularly expanding with the adoption of new legislative measures.
Since 2004, for example, the REACH regulation has largely transferred the authorization of
all chemical products to the EU level. This has engendered a lot of administrative activity. In
2009, a whole new legislative framework was adopted to fight climate change. Here too, the
level of integration has risen. The third energy package has précised the EU rules and created
a new agency. The fifth electronic communications package did the same in the field of
telecommunications. In 201 1 , a set of legislative instruments have established a new
framework for financial regulation. Notably, three financial regulation authorities were
created and granted substantial decision powers. Their decisions could thus be challenged
before the EU courts — either by way of direct action or preliminary rulings. Different
directives have also established new rules in the field of immigration.
The scope and the depth of the EU competence areas are thus expanding on a very regular
basis. The specialization of EU law has increased. Mastering the whole of the EU competence
areas becomes more difficult. The number of judgments is permanently higher. Such
evolutions will most likely increase the workload, and also have strong implications for the
judicial function.
1.3. An enlarged Union
Since 2004, 12 new countries have adhered to the EU. Generally, however, it takes a few
years for the workload to rise due to cases brought by a new member State. As happened
before, the 2004-2007 enlargements have brought immediately important new means, through
the cabinets (from 15 to 27 cabinets in both the CJ and the GC) 7 . In a first period, the number
of cases increased rather moderately. Progressively, as we shah see, it is increasing.
6 See Decision 2010/125IUE of the Council (OJ 2010, L 50/20).
The panel has already produced a first — and most interesting — activity report : Rapport d’activité du comité
prévu par l’article 255 du traité sur le fonctionnement de l’Union européenne (Doc. Council, 6509/1 1, 17.2.2011).
http:llregister.consilium.europa.eu/servletldriver?lang=FR&ssf=DATE DOCUMENT+DESC&fc=REGAISFR
&srm=25&md=400&typ=Simple&cmsid=638&ff COTE DOCUMENT=&ff_TITRE=&ff FT TEXT=article+
255+trait%C3%A9+&ff_SOUS_COTE_MATIERE=COUR&d&DATE_REUNION=&single_comparator=&si
ngle_date=&from_date=&to_date=&rc=5&nr=22&page=Detail
(accessed 17/1 1/201 1).
7 Prof. D. Chalmers described thus rightly — and poetically — the post 2004 period as “a honeymoon period of
extra resources with littie extra workload that will shortly end.” (House of Lords written evidence [WE 1], p.
16). One needs to precise however that the Court had not “an 80 % increase in personnel”. This remark is valid
only for the judges’ cabinets, but not necessarily for the rest of the services. This is an essential nuance, for the
institution’s budget and management, especially in the field of translation.
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As a matter of fact, in the Court of Justice, the number of new cases went from 537 in 2006 to
631 in 2010. In the General Court, it went from 432 to 636. The increase was thus not as high
until now as the cabinets’ increase provoked by the enlargement. A part of this increase is
linked to the enlargement of the EU, another one to the growth of the EU competence areas.
1.5. A growing backlog in the General Court
During the last five years, a backlog has grown in the General Court. This backlog is a real
threat. It goes against the rule of reasonable time 8 . It also imposes very long periods of
uncertainty to people and business.
One must underline, in this context, the difference between the backlog and the stock. It is
normal that the Court has a stock (meaning the cases which are building up and then are dealt
with). At the end of 2010, the backlog comprised around 500 cases. Obviously, some cases
have been waiting quite long to be treated. So, in 2009 and 2010, the average length of the
proceedings reached 46 months for a competition case and 41 months for a public aid case.
This indicates, by the way, that the backlog has a qualitative dimension. Most old cases are
heavy cases, requiring quite a volume of work.
It is difficult to evaluate the different causes of this situation. Many factors seem to contribute.
Some of them are of a structural nature. The use of 23 languages in very long procedures
takes time. The General Court’s role, unlike the Court of Justice’s, is flot limited to legal
matters but covers also factual matters, which can be quite heavy, for example in cases about
competition or new products’ authorizations. The procedural constraints imposed by actions
brought by natural and legal persons against the institutions, can also be heavier. Other
factors, as we shail see later, are linked to a limited productivity of human resources.
1.6. Increasing budgetary constraints
These evolutions place the CJEU, and especially the General Court, in a more difficult
situation. After the 2004 and 2007 enlargements, as we have seen, the growth of personnel
has been more substantial in the cabinets than in the administrative services. Particularly, the
doubling of the number of official languages has flot been properly taken into consideration.
Consequently, some decisions have already been taken in the three courts to reduce the need
of translations. In the General Court, for example, some judgments and orders are not
translated any more, except in the procedure’ s language.
If it goes on, the increase of the number of cases will thus create budgetary tensions. The
CJEU is placed in a particular situation. It must deal with increases of activity that it does not
control.
8 See Case C-385/07 P Der Grime Punkt [2009] ECR I-6155. This pnnciple is expressed flot only in Article 47
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights but also in Article 6(1) of the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR).
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2.1. The consequences of some fundamental choices
In that context, some fundamental choices, taken in the first European Treaties, and later in
their implementation measures, create administrative constraints and costs. Since the creation
of the European Communities, for example, European judges have a mandate of six years,
possibly renewed. This system relies on quite understandable motives, but has important
implications. Firstly, there is a permanent triennial renewal in each court, concerning 50 % of
the judges. Each transition weights on the productivity. Each triennial renewal tends to slow
the speed of the proceedings in ah chambers concerned. It also creates questioning among the
cabinets’ staff about its fate. Secondly, each anticipated departure has the same effect
(additionally) 9 . These costs are now increased by the new complexity of the appointment
process’°. Consequently, judges who only fulfil one mandate, and even sometimes less,
weight on the courts’ productivity. Thirdly, judges and personnel need to possess already
some substantial ex?erience in European matters, otherwise they weight heavily on the courts’
global productivity ‘. Another essential choice was to allow proceedings in ail the languages
of the European Union. Consequently, the proceedings’ length becomes substantially longer,
due to translation requirements, and the costs heavier.
It is not meant here to question these choices. However, one must realize that they generate
important administrative constraints, and that the new context has made these constraints
substantially heavier. It is thus interesting to reflect on the possible ways to minimize these
costs, especially if there is an important growth of judicial activity in the next decades. A
serious reflection about productivity is required, and it has a lot of implications.
2.2. Efficiency : quantity, quality and speed
Efficiency is very important in the justice world, as in all public services. However, it is very
difficuit to measure. The quantity of decisions adopted (judgments or orders) is a parameter.
However, such numbers do give absolutely no indication about the complexity of the cases.
There is also the impact of series (joined cases) on the numbers. Some of them are quite easy
to deal with, others much less so. Finally, one must also take into consideration that the
judicial function at the European level is fundamentally a collegial one. So, it remains to be
determined how much everybody contributed to the decision process.
Furthermore, quantity is certainly not everything, and quality is also an important parameter.
As Einstein brilliantly synthesized, “everything that can be counted does not necessarily
counts ; everything that counts cannot necessarily be counted”. It can even be pleaded that, at
the European level, considering the decisions’ impact on the daily life of 500 millions people,
9 During the last months of his/her mandate, a judge is inevitably less productive — and so is his/her chamber.
The opening of any new oral procedure is suspended to the arrival of a replacement.
10 Each time the « article 255 comniittee » has adopted a negative opinion on one candidate since 2010, months
of activity have been lost in transition. 11e appointment process should be streamlined to prevent the repetition
of such losses.
11 The vision of the new appointment panel created by the Lisbon Treaty is slightly different on this point : see
First activity report, 201 1, p. 9. We shail see there are objective reasons to introduce differences between the
Court of Justice and the General Court( 3.2).
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speed is also a parameter. According to a famous maxim, ‘justice delayed is justice denied”.
This is as true for cases related to fundamental individual rights as it is for business, where the
evolution of markets and technologies can make a late judgement absolutely irrelevant.
So efficiency requires to find a balance between quality, quantity and speed, and this is quite
difficult. All this must not deter from using quantity, and thus statistics, as a first basis of a
productivity analysis. Management by resuits must certainly flot represent everything in a
court of law, but on the other side il must at least represent something. Experience shows that
late judgments do not benefit from an added quality. Statistics must be however used with a
large pinch of salt, meaning carefulness and mix with other parameters to provide a correct
evaluation of the judicial activity.
2.3. Costs
Costs form a particular aspect of efficiency. Until now, they have not caught much attention,
but this will most likely change in the future. The difficulty will be to balance costs
requirements with the need for quality and the need for speed. It will not be easy at ail, since
an important part of the costs comes from the fundamental choices mentioned above( 2.1).
2.4. Adaptability
The EU remains in an evolutionary phase. Changes will happen in the next decades. Its
decision process remains quite compiex regarding the reform of the institutions. Consequently
a high premium shouid be attached to the adaptability of any new measure.
2.5. Long term coherence
Finaiiy, any systemic reform shouid not be decided without examining what has been
proposed by the Courts, and analyzed by various committees, since the negotiation of the
Maastricht Treaty. There have been many variations, and sometimes contradictions, during
these 20 years’ 2 .
Considering the difficulty of creating new organs and processes, it would be better if the
proposed measures in 201 1 were adopted with a long term perspective, based on different
hypotheses for the future. This could simplify strongly the work of the legislative authorities
in the next decade.
12 In the IGC of 2000, for example, the CJ proposed to allow in the new Treaty the transfer of some preliminary
rulings to the GC (Contribution of the Court and the CFI, 25 febr. 2000, p. 5). The CG defended the increase of
the number of judges (Cour de Justice et tribunal de première instance, L’avenir du système juridictionnel de
l’Union européenne, may 1999, p. 27).
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Many things have changed in the EU during the last 25 years. Treaties have been regularly
revised. EU legislations have grown in number, in scope and in detail. EU law has steadily
become a specialized area, and even splintered into a growing number of sub-specialized
areas. The length and number of judgments have increased. Information and Communication
Technologies (ICT) instruments have expanded considerably. The Court of Justice of the
European Union has become a much larger institution, of more than 2000 persons. However
the institution’s management has largely remained the same.
Growth, as we know, is aiways a huge challenge. “Success aiways obsoletes the very
behaviour that achieved it. (. . .) A success that has outlived its usefulness may, in the end, be
more damaging than failure.” 3 “Any organization, whether biological or social, needs to
change its basic structure if it significantly changes its size. Any organization that doubles or
triples in size needs to be restructured. Similarly, any organization, whether a business, a
nonprofit, or a government agency, needs to rethink itself once it is more than forty or fifty
years old. It has outgrown its policies and its rules of behaviour.” 14 Specifically, in the CJEU,
some established practices have become progressively inadequate.
Firstly, there is very little protection of the institution’s human capital. “The most valuable
asset of a 21Stcentury institution, whether business or nonbusiness, will be its knowledge
workers and their productivity” 5 . “The critical feature of a knowledge workforce is that
knowledge workers are not ‘labor’ , they are capital. And what is decisive in the performance
of capital is not what capital costs. (. . .) What’s critical is the productivity of capital” 6 . The
human capital is absolutely essential. In the CJEU, for various reasons, sometimes old, as we
shall sec, the loss of human capital happens on a regular basis, in the judges’ cabinets. The
General Court suffers particularly from this problem.
Furthermore, one could wonder whether the traditional appointment process takes sufficiently
into consideration the growing specialization of EU law, which requires an increased
experience level. “The yield from the human resource really determines the organization’s
performance. And that’s decided by the basic people decisions: whom we hire and whom we
fire, where we place people, and whom we promote” 7 . In the General Court, any member of
personnel who has rarely dealt in the past with various EU decisions (legislative, executive or
judicial) concerning competition, agriculture, structural funds, budgets, access to documents,
contracts, trademarks inevitabiy requires a substantially longer learning curve.
A second problem comes from the insufficiency of management by results. “Altogether
focusing resources on results is the best and most effective cost control. Cost, after all, does
flot exist by itself. It is always incurred — in intent at least — for the sake of a result. What
matters therefore is flot the absolute cost level but the ratio efforts and their results.” 8 Due to
13 DRUCKER, Management : tasks, responsibilities, practice, 1973, chap. 7 and 14.
14 DRUCKER, Managing in a time of great change, Reinventing government, 1995.
15 DRUCKER, Management challenges for the 2lst century, 2000, introduction part. 5.
16 p DRUCKER, Managing in the next society, They are not employees, they are people, 2002.
17 DRUCKER, Managing the non profit organisation, 2002, part 4(1).
18 p DRUCKER, Managing for resuits, 1964, chapter V.
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CJEU varies from three to one’ 9 .
A third problem cornes frorn the absence of perception of the different roles of the Court of
Justice and the General Court. As Drucker ernphasized, “work on knowledge-worker
productivity therefore begins with asking the knowledge workers themselves : what is the task
?20. Here, it could be considered that the specificities of the General Court’s work have not
been sufficiently analyzed until now.
In the author’s opinion, taking these elernents into consideration would allow the legislative
authorities to bring a littie bit more stability, more incentives, and thus a greater efficiency in
the General Court’s activities without a substantial increase of resources.
3.1. The improvement of the General Court’s stability
a) the problem
The first organisational difficulty in the General Court cornes frorn the high turnover of
judges, though this has flot beeri discussed in the legislative process uritil now. For a new
observer k is quite striking. The average length of a judge’ s stay in the General Court is now a
littie bit less than six years (it has decreased in the last decade). Furthermore, more or less 50
% of the judges have been appointed outside the normal triennial renewal procedure. Some
judges have resigned, others have flot been reappointed, some have reached the retirement
age, and some have left for Court of Justice. The General Court is thus in permanent
reorganization 21 , and regularly looks like the waiting room of an airport, with permanent new
arrivais, departures, announcements. . . and delays 22 .
Considering the General Court’s role, this constitutes a fundamental handicap. Numbers
sometimes speak loudly. Having a permanent renewal of 50 % of ail members and 100 % of
ail chambers on a three years basis, when the heaviest cases may require four years for
various incompressible constraints, is definitely flot a recipe for efficiency. This situation
prevents a lot of judges from using the experience accumulated. It provokes the regular
19 For the GC, this has been evoked by the CCBE (Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe) in the House of
Lords (at the level of chambers) : House of Lords oral evidence [WE 9], pp. 25 and 28.
20 Knowledge-worker productivity : the biggest challenge, California Management Review, XLI :2 (1999), 79-
94.
21 Interestingly, this bas been emphasized about the Court of Justice by some of its members in front of the
House of Lords (The workload of the Court of Justice of the European Union, HL Paper 128, April 201 1, § 83).
The difficulty is in fact bigger for the General Court, since the length of its proceedings is longer.
22 Just when die draft of this text was finished, a judge of the GC presented his resignation, due to exceptional
political circumstances in his country. As well informed observers have immediately indicated, this will
inevitably provoke the transfer of numerous heavy cases, the reopening of various hearings, and the designation
of new judges in many cases. Furthermore, these problems could be compounded by some new departures to the
Court of Justice during 2012 (see MLex comment, 16 nov. 201 1, Monti’s choice of EU judge for Italian
government spelis uncertainty for CISAC appeals).
Once again, the problem bas everything to see with the absence of stability, and nothing with die absence of
specialization. One sees here a chamber formed in 2010, reorganized one time in 201 1, possibly a second time in
2012, and most probably a third time in 2013 with the triennial renewal (each time with possible collateral
effects on other chambers). 11e mentioned cases could additionally be attributed three times to a differentjudge.
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concentrates the workload on some of the most stable cabinets. Finally, and crucially, since ail
cabinets’ members depend on the mandate of the judges, it engenders a general instability of
personnel. It has been estimated that the average length of a iegai secretary (“référendaire”) is
five years. So, permanentiy, new peopie enter and begin to buiid a basic knowiedge whiie
others leave with their buiit knowledge to use it elsewhere. No wonder the average
productivity levei remains limited.
From this point of view, the transfer of a judge from the General Court to the Court of Justice
represents the most damaging event. When a judge goes back home, (s)he goes back alone.
When (s)he ieaves for the Court, (s)he generaliy leaves with the whole team. During the iast
decade, the General Court has thus become sometimes some kind of training ground for the
Court ofJustice, losing reguiariy a strong volume of accumulated experience.
0f course, renewals present also advantages. They bring fresh ideas and experiences, for
example. Nevertheless, in the balance between stability and renewal, the present system errs
clearly too much on the side of renewal and not enough on the side of stability. Any
proposition must imperatively take this into consideration. So the first result of a management
approach reveals immediately the great difficulty of the topic. An important part of the weak
productivity can be connected to the way the Member States use the appointment process.
b) some possible solutions
. Considering the need for stability, Member States and candidates should for example
begin any appointment process in the General Court with a perspective of two
mandates.
. For the same reason, the Member States could prevent any transfer ofjudges between
the General Court and the Court of Justice during a period of 10 years (otherwise the
General Court remains a training ground for some judges and legal secretaries of the
Court ofJustice).
. If Member States want a better performance, they must accept constraints when
performance is delivered. They could for example commit themselves to reappoint
judges in the General Court once, if the judge’s cabinet presents a record after 6 years
at least at the average productivity level (see § 3.2)24.
. The transfer of cabinets’ collaborators between the three courts of the CJEU should be
allowed only after a minimal activity period of 6 years for administrative personnel,
and 8 years for legal secretaries (and thus 10 years for the judges).
23 A case often mentioned is the ICI case (see House of Lords written evidence [WE 1], pp. 9-10). Most
interestingly, this case was reallocated two times between judges and three times between chambers. Many
people however keep on calling for more specialization and flot for more stability.
24 i would ifitroduce a restrictiofi ifi the appoifltmeflt process, but the Court of Justice’s propositiofi, with the
Commissiofl’s precisiofis, would produce in fact a similar resuit, since h would restrict the ability of the Member
States to renew somejudges.
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a) the problem
One important fallacy of the present reform debate resides in the absence of distinction
between the Court of Justice and the General Court. The differences between the two courts
appear huge. The Court of Justice is dealing with constitutional questions and preliminary
legal questions from national judges. The General Court is dealing with most direct actions
against the acts of the European authorities and has to control numerous and complex facts.
The workload is comparatively heavier, as the House of Lords has emphasized after the
CCBE. “In large competition cases. . . five, seven or ten applicants may be challenging a
decision of the Commission of 600 pages or more, and the file may consist of 20 000
pages” 25 .
A second Çgeneral) problem lies in the lack of accountability. “Quis custodiet ipsos
custodes?”
2 “Management — and not only in the business enterprise — has to be accountable
for performance. (. ..) Managers have flot yet faced up to the fact that they represent power —
and power has to be accountable, has to be legitimate” 27 . “Managing others is most effectively
donc by example rather than by preaching or policy. (. . .) If the example is lacking, the most
moving sermon and the wisest policy rarely work. 28 ”
b) some possible solutions
. The need for a substantial experience in EU law is in fact greater in the General Court,
since it deals quasi exclusively with this area, with a lot of technical elements and
facts, when the Court of Justice covers also the national legal systems, and limits itself
to the legal questions. This should be taken into consideration during the appointment
process.
. The article 255 committee already indicated that it could review control the activity of
sitting judges 29 . This should be explored. For example, all judges at the end of their
mandate should present an activity report, indicating the number of settled cases and
of backlog cases 30 . The comrnittee could thus convoke any candidate for a renewal
with a backlog 20 % greater than the average. A dialog could thus help to determine
the causes of such a situation (which can be extremely different according to the
context 31 ).
25 The workload of the Court ofJustice of the European Union, HL Paper 128, April 201 1 , § 45 and Q 71).
This statement needs to be understood quite precisely. It does not mean that the work at the General Court is
more important (it is not). h does not mean that the work at the General Court is legally more complex (it is flot).
Itjust means that the control of numerous and complex facts requires more hours per case.
26 JUVENAL, Satires, VI.
27 p DRUCKER, The new realities, 1989, chap. 15.
28 p DRUCKER, The changing world ofthe executive, 1985, p. 1.
29 Article 255 committee, First activity report, 201 1, p. 3.
30 ‘ns activity report should be submitted to the concemed national government and to the article 255
committee. It would of course exclusively cover the management aspects of the work.
31 Wheri backlog cases are transferred from one cabinet to another one, for example, the new cabinet will have to
bear this responsibility dunng one, two or sometimes three years.
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a) the problem
A curious omission in the various analyses about the situation of the EU courts concerns the
cabinet personnel’s 32 . Most analyses evaluate the average length of a legal secretary’s
mandate to five years. As we have seen, this is quite a limited length, considering that there is
already a huge turnover of judges. Furthermore, this leaves littie margin to use accumulated
experience to improve the productivity.
This source of weakness is compounded in the General Court by two factors. Firstly, legal
secretaries may easily be tempted by a transfer to the Court of justice, where collaborators
enjoy a slightly better pay for a slightly average reduced workload. Secondly, legal secretaries
in the General Court are more easily recycled into the specialized lawyers’ offices,
considering the role of the General Court in competition law.
Legal secretaries are well paid, and deservedly when they are productive since their job is
difficuit. Furthermore, their contract can aiways been cancelled in a three month’ s period.
However, besides money, there are few perspectives for them. ‘Knowledge workers know
when they can leave. They have both the mobility and confidence. This means they have to be
treated and managed as volunteers. . . The first thing such people want to know is what the
company is trying to do and where it is going. Next, they are interested in personal
achievement and personal responsibility — which means they have to be put into the right job.
Knowledge workers expect continuous learning and continuous training. Above ail, they want
respect. . .for the area of their knowledge” 33 . Basically, “ail organizations say routinely ‘People
are our greatest asset’. Yet few practise what they preach, let alone truly believe it.” 34 In the
CJEU, on one side, there are no ways to reward exceptional performance. On the other side,
the recognition of legal secretaries is quite limited, as training and minimal security. This is
probably flot the best context to generate a long term commitment to the institution.
It could also be said that a single pay level is a limited instrument for an institution in
permanent need of more or less 200 legal secretaries. Considering the growing specialization
of EU law, and also of the EU judicial function, the hiring and training of younger personnel
could also be contemplated.
b) some possible solutions
. At this level, too, there is a need to find a better balance between renewal and stability.
Without creating new public servants, the idea would be to create a slightly more
stable hard core of collaborators, chosen on the basis of their excellent and durable
32 Commentaries about this topic remain quite rare. See for example GRASS, Les resources humaines à la Cour
de justice, in Le droit à l’épreuve de l’homme - Mélanges Philippe Léger, Pedone, 2006, pp. 69-78
JOHANSSON, The role and importance of legal secretaries: sometimes underrated, legal secretaries (or
référendaires) in fact play a vital role in helping to shape EU, in Competition law insight, Vol. 6 (2007), issue 7,
p. 1 1-13 ; DEMETRIOU, The role of référendaires at the European Court, The EC taxjournal, Vol. 7 (2003/4),
issue 1, p. 1-5 ; GERVASONI, Des référendaires et de la magistrature communautaire, in L’Etat souverain dans
le monde d’aujourd’hui — Mélanges J.P. Puissochet, Pedone, 2008, pp. 105-116.
33 P. DRUCKER, Managing the next society, 2002.
34 P. DRUCKER, Managing in a time of great change, 1995.
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flot necessarily better paid but with a more stable status (6 years, renewable),
contractually linked to the General Court, and not to a particular judge. k would allow
a longer exit period, and a greater writing freedom.
On the other side, it would be interesting to create a junior status, requiring limited
experience, which would allow the hiring of young recruits, who could be trained for
later possible promotion.
Information about candidates should be centralized in each court, with a serious
internai and indicative evaluation process. This would ailow the court to propose
immediately operationai candidates to new judges when they arrive.
Ail pay differences between the legai secretaries in the CJ and the OC should be
abandoned.
3.4. Better incentives for parties to control costs
a) the problem
For various reasons, mentioned above, the EU judicial process is often a long, complex and
costly one. Any difficuity provoked during this process is thus bound to create delays and
costs. This does not prevent many parties from disrespecting the practice directions to parties.
For example, in 2010, nearly 50 % of applications in the General Court did flot respect the
practice directions. Moreover, nearly 40 % required one or even sometimes two
regularizations. This engenders flot only costs, but also delays. Here, again, the General Court
is more exposed. The files are heavier. The General Court has to deal with ail direct actions
brought by natural or legai persons against acts of the institutions.
b) some possible solutions
. A new category of procedurai costs couid be created. Whenever a party does flot
respect the practice directions, it should bear the additional administrative costs
provoked by this violation. Some flat fees would be estabiished for the most common
violations. The Courts could increase them for the most serious ones.
. More generaliy, a reflection shouid be launched about the participation of enterprises
to the costs ofjustice 35 . A Court fee shouid be fixed for some cases, ensuring a right
balance between the principle of fair access to justice and an adequate contribution of
the parties for the costs incurred by the Court, recognizing the economic benefits for
the parties involved 36 .
35 Revealing, the elimination of the backlog in the CST “appears to be partly the resuit of the. . . introduction of a
costs disincentive, whereby the person who loses the litigation pays ail the costs” (The workload of the Court of
Justice of the European Union, HL Paper 128, April 201 1, § 55).
36 Most interestingly, such a mechanism has already been integrated in the draft agreement for a Unified Patent
Court (Council EU n° 15539/11, art. 18).
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The addition of new legal secretaries has been proposed by Committee on Legal Affairs of the
European Parliament as a first measure to fight the General Court’s backlog. Interestingly,
this option had initially been supported neither by the Court of Justice, nor by the General
Court.
However, this solution is certainly less costly than the structural ones. It could also deliver a
much quicker resuit regarding the General Court’s backlog. It is the most flexible. The
advantage of a pool would be to allow the use of the new personnel units in the most
productive teams, to accelerate the liquidation of the backlog. Finally, in case the backlog
finally disappears, the resources can be easily reduced (this will most certainly flot happen
with the structural measures, and especially the 12 new cabinets). Finally, provided it is
accompanied by some other productivity incentives mentioned above, such a measure could
create a strong stream ofchange 37 .
3.6. The creation of a specialized trademark and designs court inside the 0111M
Applicants for trademarks have become incredibly protected citizens. They benefit from a
double administrative decision at the 0H1M 38 , can lay an application in front of the General
Court, and stiil have an appeal right in front of the Court of Justice. Enterprises receiving a
300 million Euros cartel fine, or Member States obliged to reimburse 100 million Euros
subsidies do not benefit from the same protection.
A quite simple way to reduce the workload of the General Court without incurring any
additional costs would be to transform the second administrative level in the Office into a
specialized Court 39 . This could be easily financed by the OHIM, since it possesses now
financial reserves of more than 400 million Euros 40 .
37 A small parallel increase in the registrar’s resources will also be needed, to deal with the additional workload
provoked by the elimination of the backlog.
i8 To be precise : Office for Harmonization in the Internai Market (Trade Marks and Designs)
39 ns option has also been suggested by former Advocate Generai Jacobs in the House of Lords : House of
Lords oral evidence [WE 3], Q 82.
40 nis option will still be more efficient if it is combined with a measure concerning some enterprises’
participation to the costs ofjustice (see § 3.4).
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Though the productivity solutions appear as a priority, it remains necessary to compare the
efficiency of the possible two structural solutions : the addition of I 2 new cabinets to the
General Court, or the creation of a specialized court, limited in a first phase to a specific
domain of trademarks and designs. The first solution bas been officially proposed by the
Court of Justice and supported by the Commission. The second one bas been defended by the
General Court 41 . FD
In that context, the Court of Justice’s proposai is a hybrid one. It proposes the addition of 12
new cabinets to the General Court, but also a partial specialization of this Court 42 . This hybrid
approach is also supported by the Commission 43 . (It is noteworthy to remember that until now
the General Court bas neyer been formally consulted about the technical aspects of this
solution.) The Court of Justice and the Commission indicate that this would promote
efficiency. For the Court of Justice, this approacb seems also strongly justified by the need to
control ail appeal procedures 44 . It invokes some “risks in relation to the very consistency of
EU law” 45 . The Court of Justice makes a structural link between the appeals and the
preliminary rulings 46 . This une of reasoning is quite general and categorical, and thus can
have a huge strategic consequence for the future. Ail procedures being linked, and ail appeals
41 For a comparative legal analysis of these options, see LOUIS, La ‘réforme’ du statut de la Cour, CDE, 2011,
pp. 1-9.
42 “It is essential that [an increase in the number of judges] be accompanied at the same time by reflection on
how to make the best use of ail the General Court’s resources, perhaps through specialisation by certain
chambers and flexible management of case allocation” (Proposai ofthe Court ofJustice, Doc. 8787/1 1, p. 10).
43 “Some subject-matter specialisation by several Generai Court chambers wouid thus appear to be necessary to
ensure more efficient and rapid handiing of cases, while preserving die necessary flexibiiity so as to adapt to
emerging types of disputes. Whiie it is for the General Court to set down the detaiis of such speciaiisation in its
Ruies of Procedure, die principle shouid be enshrined in die Statute itseif to guarantee permanence.”( 36-37).
As we shah see, the Commission defended a compieteiy opposite analysis in 2007, when the creation of a
competition court was debated.
44 « It is highiy desirable that a single court — the Court of Justice — should ensure the uniform interpretation of
the relevant texts, whether by means of a preiiminary ruiing or in the context of an appeai. It is ail the more
essentiai that that pnncipie be observed since not every important iegai issue conceming trade mark law has yet
been determined, and the fieid of inteliectual property interacts closely with other matters within the jurisdiction
of the Court of Justice, such as the free movement of goods or consumer protection » (Further information from
the Court of Justice, Doc. 12719/1 1 , p. 5).
It is useful to indicate here that the case-iaw concerned here is very specific, factual, and deais only with a few
provisions covering trademarks and designs. 11e connection with other general matters is consequently very
iimited. Interestingiy, this was aiready the conclusion of the House of Lords in 2007, supported at the time by the
European Commission (House of Lords, An EU competition court, HL Paper 75, Aprii 2007, § 165-173).
45 “It is necessary to underiine the risks in relation to the very consistency of European Union law, particularly in
an area such as that of inteiiectual property, that may be associated with the creation of a specialised court in the
field of inteiiectuai property. As the Court observed in its draft amendments to the Statute, there are in fact a
number of facets to trade mark iitigation. It includes, on the one hand, challenges before the General Court and,
if necessary, before the Court of Justice, regarding intellectual property rights under Community law and, on the
other, challenges before national courts which can refer questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling
on the interpretation or validity of relevant reguiations, directives or international agreements” (Further
information from the Court of Justice, Doc. 127 1 9/1 1 , p. 5).
46 “Since those cases form, in reality, a single block, it is highly desirable that a single court — the Court of
Justice — should ensure the uniform interpretation of the relevant texts, whether by means of a preliminary ruling
or in the context of an appeal. It is ail the more essential that that principle be observed since not every important
legal issue concerning trade mark law has yet been determined, and the field of intellectual property interacts
closely with other matters within the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice, such as the free movement of goods or
consumer protection” (Further information from the Court of Justice, Doc. 12719/1 1, p. 5).
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fact any transfer of attributions between these Courts can stili be possible. The final
interrogation then becomes what will happen with the three-tiers system established by the
Nice Treaty.
In that context, the experience of the Civil Service Tribunal (CST) is essential. One can make
(and makes) many speeches about specialized courts in theory, but the CST provides the only
real experiment of a specialized court of the EU until now 47 . Here too, a few basic
management principles apply. “Commit early on quality. Grow slowly. Diversify your
expertise. Short term can be terminal. Don’t let structures run the operation. Think
flexibility.” 48
r.i. The greater efficiency of a specialized court
a) the positive resuits of the CST experience
The evaluation of efficiency requires the taking into consideration of quality (here the
consistency of the case-law), quantity and speed. From the point of view of quality, nobody
seems to consider that the transfer of public servants’ cases from the GC to the CST has
provoked any loss — on the contrary. From the point of view of quantity, it can be said that the
GC’ s backlog has progressively been eliminated by the CST. The productivity per head is also
much higher in the CST (as explained below § 4.2, this has an important impact on costs).
From the point of view of speed, finally, the average length of procedure is clearly shorter in
the CST than in the GC. No wonder everybody, from the President of the Court of Justice to
the House of Lords, presents the CST as a “success story” 49 .
This is flot very difficuit to understand. The creation of a specialized court allows to harvest
the real benefits of specialization. Firstly, recruitment can be more focused. This concerns flot
only judges, but also legal secretaries and administrative personnel. One could add that, at the
EU level, the judges’ recruitment is more targeted. Furthermore, procedural rules,
functioning, training can be adapted to the specific domain of specialization.
A recent development, however, could limit the comparative value of the specialized court
option. It concerns the appointment process of judges. It seems that the latest renewal of the
CST reflects a will of the Member States not to renew any member any more 50 . If the Member
States intend to prohibit henceforth the renewal of any judge after six years, they will reduce
most likely the level of performance.
47 See the very enlightening and realistic comment of P. MAHONEY, The Civil Service Tribunal : the benefits
and drawbacks of a specialized judicial body, 3 1/1 Human Rights Law Journal 1 1-15 (201 1) ; and H.
KRAEMER, The European Union Civil Service Tribunal : a new Community Court examined after four years of
operation, 46 Common Market Law Review 1873-1913 (2009).
4 M.H. McCORMACK, What they don’t teach you at Harvard Business School, 1984, chap. 1 1 and 12.
49 “The report on die Tribunal is a very positive one” (V. SKOURIS, 5th anniversary of the CST, 3 1/1 Human
Rights Law Journal 3) ; “The CST is a success story” (House of Lords EU committee : The workload of the
Court of Justice of the European Union, HL Paper 128, 201 1, § 55). If this is the case, it would probably be very
useful to deploy more efforts to repeat this success story.
50 Two members were candidates for a renewal, including the President, and they were not renewed in 201 1 . If
the Member States repeat this approach in 2014, three more members will have to leave, including the new
President. This is hardly the best recipe for performance and quality.
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Establishing specialized chambers in the General Court is something very different from
establishing a specialized court. It is necessary to remember that the General Court essentially
works in chambers of three judges. As the House of Lords already mentioned in 2007, the
specialization of judges can lead to problems of representation 51 . It can also generate
important problems for the judgments’ quality, because the role of the reportingjudge is much
heavier in the GC than in theCi 52 . Finally, it can also provoke oppositions from the point of
view of juge légal or gesetzlicher Rechter 3 . These consistency problems, though already
evoked in previous debates, have not been examined until now. (Incidentally, one of the
advantages of a specialized court in trademarks and designs would be to avoid them.)
The Court of Justice’ s solution, as we have seen, is motivated by its preoccupation to protect
consistency by keeping ah appeals in its attributions. There are quite different opinions about
the fundamental nature of questions raised by the specific domain of trademarks and designs
which is concerned. Anyway, even if there is a real difficulty, a much better solution could be
to propose a revision of the Nice Treaty on this specific point. (The Court of Justice as a
matter of fact already proposed this in 1 995)54W Such an approach requires however to answer
a fundamental question about the future (see § 4.4).
c) the reduced stability of an enlarged General Court
The propositions of the Court of Justice and the Commission do not offer any hope to reduce
the present instability in the General Court 55 . On the contrary, they risk aggravating it. They
introduce a lot of fixed terms in the General Court, which can hardly be seen as a factor of
stability, either for the judges or the personnel.
51 ris was already mentioned by the House of Lords in 2007, « the creation of. . . specialist chambers within the
CFI is not an attractive option. (. . .) Even if extra judges were appointed, the majority of Member States would
no longer have judges sitting on competition cases. This is unlikely to be acceptable to Member States. » (An EU
competition court, HL Paper 75, April 2007, § 122 and 201).
52 Here, too, there are important differences between the Court of Justice and the General Court. In the Court of
Justice, whoever the reporting judge may be, all important cases go to the great chamber. 11e situation is very
different in the General Court. The huge majority of cases are dealt with by chambers of three judges, and the
weight of the reporting judge is thus much greater. Any specialization can thus lead to a very different
representation of legal cultures, and less coherence, if there are no protection mechanisms. From this point of
view, the parties could begin to observe with the greatest interest who the specialized judges in trade policy,
public aids, agricultural subsidies or transparency will be. As was emphasized by die CCBE, “chambers of 3 are
particularly problematic because of the lack of checks and balances. They put a lot of power in the hands of
individual judges and there is less room for wider deliberation.” (House of Lords oral evidence [WE 9], p. 18).
This statement is stili more valid for the GC than for the CJ.
53 See about this the debate in the House of Lords in 2007 : House of Lords, An EU competition court, HL Paper
75, April 2007, § 116.
54 Report for the IGC, May 1995, p. 8.
55 In its opinion, the Commission has foreseen a possible obstacle, but could not find the proper solution (one
wonders whether it exists) and thus introduced a caveat. « A certain [emphasis addedl amount of stability in
terms of the composition of the General Court must be guaranteed by maintaining as far as can be the
possibilities of renewing the ternis ofjudges. Given the technical nature of the subjects handled by the General
Court and the increased need for specialisation there, it is important that the judges who have worked efficiently
can possibly have their terms renewed. If the increase from 27 judges to 39 were to undermine this possibility,
then this reform should be seriously reconsidered.”( 45).
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precisely engender some anticipated exit strategies, for judges or members of personnel. The
huge turnover is thus bound to increase, creating sometimes mandates for two or three
remaining years of very limited productivity. Without corrections, such situations could
sometimes offer more perspectives forjudicial tourism than for judicial performance.
d) the new difficulties for personnel’s management in an enlarged General Court
The propositions of the Court of Justice and the Commission also mention nothing about the
requirements of personnel’s management. From this point of view, if the judge’s
specialization is permanent, this introduces a lot of inflexibility. If it is not permanent, (which
seems the working hypothesis), it introduces a lot of additional instability. In this case, are
judges for example meant to change collaborators each time they change specialization ? The
proposed solution appears thus as more theoretical than practical, looking good on paper but
susceptible to drift quickly into a managerial mess.
Generally, though this reality still seems hard to accept, it should be emphasized here that the
cabinets form the essential production unit, flot the judges. “The leaders who work most
effectively neyer say ‘I’. And thats not because they have trained themselves not to say ‘I.
They dont think 1’. They think ‘we’; they thirik ‘team’. They uriderstand theirjob to be to make
the team function.” 56 Consequently, ah propositions that do flot take the team’ s needs into
consideration are ipsofacto iricomplete.
e) productivity iii an enlarged General Court
For various reasons, specialized chambers in the Gerieral Court wouid bring at the best much
less productivity increase than expected. Firstly, as we have seen with the CST, specialized
judges can bring iricreased productivity if the appointment process of judges arid legal
secretaries takes this specialization irito consideratiori. No one has indicated yet how this
could be possible inside the Gerieral Court 57 . Secondly, there is already an informal
occasiorial specialization in the attribution of cases to the chambers 58 . Thirdly, the
specializatiori ofjudges can easily lead to an increased disparity of the cabinets’ workload. At
the worse, without the proper modalities, the proposed specialization could in fact provide
negative productivity incentives. Consequently, there seem to be essential elements missing in
the debated proposals.
4.2. The smaller costs of a specialized court
As far as costs are concerned, the situation appears very clear. In a 2010 analysis, P. Mahoney
indicated that, per legal secretary, “the productivity of the CST compares more than
favourably ; over the period between 2007 and 2009, for example, the CST could be said to be
3.2 times more productive than the GC and 2.9 more productive than the CJ” 59 . There is a
56 DRUCKER, Management : tasks, responsibility, practice, 1973, chap. 18.
57 Here too, the Commission has seen the problem and explored the possibility in its opinion. R proposed the
appointment of specializedjudges as a second option. This however does flot eliminate ail difficulties.
5 nis was aiready expiained in a quite explicit comment of President Vesterdorf in the House of Lords in
2007 : House of Lords, An EU competition court, HL Paper 75, Aprii 2007, § 1 17 and Q 426.
59 i’. MAHONEY, 11e Civil Service Tribunal : the benefits and drawbacks of a specialized judicial body, 31/1
Human Rights Law Journal 1 1-15 (201 1).
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201 0 numbers indicate a productivity ratio of I ,97 for the Court of justice, 2,99 for the
General Court, and 5,61 for the Civil Service Tribunal. So it takes nearly three times as much
personnel to settie a case in the general courts than in the specialized one.
Furthermore, flot only the productivity per personnel unit is substantially higher, but the costs
per unit are slightly lower, which is a second benefit. The CST is thus not only a success story
regarding the diminution of the backlog or the length of the proceedings, but also from the
budgetary point of view. The costs criterion favours very clearly the creation of specialized
courts, and this should be considered as an essential sign for the long term 61 . Should the
judicial activity increase strongly, the path of enlarging the General Court could provoke an
explosion of costs. Hence the necessity to explore as much as possible the potentialities of
specialized courts.
4.3. The slightly greater adaptability a specialized court
Clearly, since both reforms are structural, both implicate some rigidity. The creation of a
specialized court implicates a new court, and thus a permanent structure. If the number of
applications decreases, the structure would become less productive. This risk seems quite
limited, however, since the pressure to integrate the law of intellectual property in Europe is
not going to diminish, as the sole domain of patents indicates. However, even if the level of
activity decreases, it is aiways possible to reduce the number of judges, or to increase the
attributions of a specializedcourt 62 .
On the other side, the propositions of the Court and the Commission present the addition of
12 additional cabinets to the GC as a more flexible solution. Again, in theory, it may seem
right ; it is quite simple flot to renew some judges in case they are not necessary any more. In
practice, however, it is a completely different matter, as all people involved in institutional
negotiations know. Wherever there is a balance of representation, it is aiways extremely
difficult to abandon it.
Furthermore, specialized chambers in the General Court could reduce its adaptability. This
had — quite paradoxically — already been emphasized by the Commission in 2007. “The more
specialised chambers you have, the less flexibility you have in tuming the cases to a chamber
or to another” 63 .
60 The Pppu is the ratio between the number of closed cases and the cabinets’ personnel (judges or advocate
generals and their collaborators). Cabinets consist of eight persons in the CJ, six persons in the GC, and three
persons in the CST. Adjustments have been made for the presidents’ personnel. Ail data corne frorn the available
reports of activity of the CJEU and its budgets.
61 It is sometimes invoked that the creation of a specialized court entails more administrative outlays due to the
creation of a new registrar. This is not correct. The growing number of applications must aiways be deait with by
new members of personnel, wherever it happens. New jobs will have to be created anyway, either in a
specialized court or in the extended General Court.
Furtherrnore, at least as a transitory measure, the registrar of the CST could be used for a new specialized
court. This could accelerate the launching of the specialized court.
62 The attributions of the CST could thus be extended, for exarnple, to other areas of the administrative activity
of the institutions, quite restricted and where the case law is well established, like public tenders or contractual
liability. The very limited attributions of a trademarks and designs court could be extended to other aspects of
these topics, or to other topics of intellectual property.
63 Declaration of the Director General of the Legal Service, House of Lords, An EU cornpetition court, HL Paper
75, April 2007, § 119.
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Ail actors involved, including the citizens, would be better served by the definition of a long
term strategy, taking into consideration ail relevant future constraints. The last thing we need
is a reform that will need a serious reform in a few years, and which will have blocked some
options meanwhile. “Wisdom consists of the anticipation of consequences” (N. Cousins).
Firstly, the number of cases should go on rising in the future. The CJ and the GC will thus
have more work. The number of the judges in the CJ has been blocked by the Treaties. Thus
sooner or later the CJ will need to make new transfers of cases to the GC. The first strategic
interrogation turns around that. What is the maximum level of cases that the Ci can accept?
When this level will be reached, what must be transferred to the General Court ? From its
present proposition, one could deduce that the Court of Justice intends to keep both ail
prejudiciai rulings and ail appeals in its exclusive area of competence 64 . However, this is a
fundamental change of approach, which goes against the vision of the Nice Treaty.
Furthermore, at the end, it does simply not seemfeasible 65 .
Secondly, if the workload of the GC increases, it will become necessary to create, when
possible, some specialized courts. In that context, the trademarks and designs domain offers a
unique opportunity to prepare the future. The legal domain is circumscribed. The systematic
implications are very limited. The case-law is widely settled. Most clearly, new intellectual
property litigation will have to be dealt with in the next decades (patents, copyrights
especially in the information society). Here cornes the second strategic question. If the
creation of a specialized court is not envisaged here, when wili it be ?66
Ail this confirms strongly the wisdom of the Nice Treaty vision for the European courts’
system : a CJ concentrated on constitutional litigation, with a limited appeal faculty
controlling the essential legal problems, a GC as an adjustment mechanism, dealing with the
general flow of individual applications and some growing segments of activity, and some
specialized courts aiming at the highest productivity in specific segments of activity
characterized by well established legal principles. From the management point of view, and
from the point of view of costs, this three tiers system makes a lot of sense.
64 Among other consequences, enlarging the General Court increases the Court of Justice’s workload through the
growth of appeals.
65 There are other possible paths, but at the end something aiways needs to be transferred. See for example
LENAERTS, La réorganisation de l’architecturejuridictionnelle de l’Union européenne : quel angle d’approche
adopter ?, in M. DONY et E. BRIBOSIA dirs., L’avenir du système juridictionnel de l’Union européenne, ULB,
2002, pp. 49-64 ; FORWOOD, The Court of first instance its development and future role in the legal
architecture of the European Union, in Continuity and change in EU law — Essays in honor of Sir Francis Jacobs,
2008, pp. 34-47.
66 As Advocate General Jacobs indicated, « if we are looking at specialised tribunals, we are really looking at
areas where there is a European body taking a series of decisions that have to be open to challenge before a
tribunal. If the nature of the subject matter is appropriate — it is a sufficiently specialised area ; it is distinct from
other areas of EU law ; it can be isolated and identified ; and if there is a sufficient number of cases in that area”
House of Lords oral evidence [WE 3j, p. 60).
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. The functioning of the EU courts is based on elements which have become partly
outdated in a new working environment. Many elements of this environment have
changed. If one wants to improve performance, this must be taken into consideration.
In that framework, the CJEU could certainly benefit from a better preservation of its
human capital, a greater role for management by resuits, and the recognition of the
specificities of the General Court’s work. Ail propositions regarding the General Court
should take these priorities into consideration. Some of the presently debated
proposais do flot, arid could as a matter of fact worsen in some aspects the present
situation.
Strong improvements could be made through the strengthening of the General Court’s
stability, and the creation of better incentives for judges, personnel and parties. They
would require very limited additional means, but imply that ail actors involved
(Member States’ govemments, General Court’ s judges and personnel, Court of Justice,
budgetary authorities, and legal counsels) accept some changes.
Particularly, the greatest thing that the Member States could do for the General Court
is to commit themselves to condition any renewal to a minimal level of performance
and to renew once ail judges whose cabinets reach an average level. This will create
much more stability and performance incentives for everyone, will have an
instantaneous effect, and will flot request any outlay. Member States must be aware
that the appointment process needs anyway some kind of streamiining after the entry
into force of the Lisbon Treaty, to minimize the costs provoked by various delays.
If productivity solutions are not introduced beforehand, both structural solutions, and
especialiy the creation of new cabinets in the General Court, are bound to increase
average costs. Unlike the multiplication of bread and fish, there are few miracles to
expect from a simple multiplication ofjudges. The structural solutions should thus be
considered as subsidiary options.
. In the present situation, there is an urgency linked to the backlog. The General Court
certainly needs a limited amount of additional personnel (legal secretaries and registrar
agents) to deal with the existing backlog. This is the simplest, quickest, cheapest, and
most flexible instrument to deal with the problems (especially if it is combined with
some additional productivity measures).
If a specialized court is created in the field of trademarks and designs (and later in
other domains), the need of a minimal stability should equally be taken into
consideration in the judges’ appointment process.
. The system always runs the risk of a sudden eruption ofjudicial activity in a new EU
domain. There is thus a need for contingency planning (even if this scenario has flot
yet materialized). From this point of view, the proposition to add new cabinets to the
General Court must be kept in mmd. It needs however further study, to prevent some
dangerous negative consequences.
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One cannot take such a fundamental decision without defining first a strategic
perspective. This requires to define what the ceiling of activity of the Court of Justice
is, and what should be done when it will be reached. These are the two strategic
questions. At the end, the Court itself will become overloaded, and a redefinition of its
attributions will be needed. The time to think about this is now.
In synthesis, a management approach would allow to deal with the present backlog of
the General Court while strongly minimizing the costs. It would rely on (a)
productivity solutions to improve slightly the Court personnel’s stability on a
condition of performance ; (b) additional personnel to be allocated to the most
productive teams ; (c) the creation of a specialized Trademark and Designs Court,
preferably in the framework of OHIM, and (d) the addition of new cabinets to the
General Court if all previous solutions fail and modalities have been found to protect
the Court’ s stability.
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